Multiple Defendant Settlement in 10b-5: Good Faith Contribution Bar by Davis, Wm. Bruce
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 40 | Issue 6 Article 4
1-1989
Multiple Defendant Settlement in 10b-5: Good
Faith Contribution Bar
Wm. Bruce Davis
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wm. Bruce Davis, Multiple Defendant Settlement in 10b-5: Good Faith Contribution Bar, 40 Hastings L.J. 1253 (1989).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol40/iss6/4
Multiple Defendant Settlement in 10b-5:
Good Faith Contribution Bar
By
WM. BRUCE DAVIS*
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule lOb-5 1 provides
the dominant private remedy for securities fraud.2 Private actions under
lOb-5 commonly involve multiple defendants who may be jointly and
severally liable.3 In these situations, less culpable defendants generally
possess a right to contribution from more culpable ones.4 If all the par-
ties litigate the matter to a judgment, there are few problems in determin-
ing contribution rights among the defendants-standard rules of
contribution will apply.5
When one or more of the defendants settle with the plaintiff, how-
ever, problems arise in determining how the settlement affects the judg-
ment and how to apportion the judgment among the remaining
* B.S., San Jose State University, 1986; Member, Second Year Class.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240 lOb-5 (1988). It provides:
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. Id.
2. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 445 (1985).
3. See, eg., In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); In re
United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp.
1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987); First Fed. Say. & Loan v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 631 F.
Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Harrison v. Sheats, 608 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
4. E.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1987); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
459 U.S. 375 (1983); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331-34 (7th Cir. 1979); Globus, Inc.
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 442
F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971). Contra In re Professional Fin. Management Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 1283,
1286-87 (D. Minn. 1988).
5. See Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981).
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defendants. In negotiating settlements, the parties need to know how a
proposed settlement will affect the rights and duties of the nonsettling
parties. Settling plaintiffs want to know the extent to which a settlement
will decrease an eventual judgment. Settling defendants want a final de-
termination of their liability. 6 Nonsettling defendants need assurance
that their liability is not disproportionate to their culpability. Finally,
society has an interest in the fair and speedy disposition of potentially
complex litigation.
Courts have expressed incongruent views on how settlements affect
contribution rights.7 Although the issue remains unresolved, one may
detect a trend in recent court decisions that settlement extinguishes the
contribution rights of the remaining defendants against the settling de-
fendant. 8 If a partial settlement bars contribution claims by nonsettling
defendants, it is necessary to determine how the settlement bar9 will af-
fect the ultimate judgment.
This Note explores the issues surrounding settlements in lOb-5 ac-
tions, advocates that under certain conditions partial settlements should
bar contribution and proposes a solution to the potential problems cre-
ated by barring contribution. Section I briefly examines the development
of the private cause of action and the right of contribution under Rule
lOb-5. Section II elaborates on the circumstances that should bar contri-
bution and describes an equitable standard for approving such settle-
ments. Section III analyzes various methods of apportioning judgments
among the defendants remaining after an approved settlement. This sec-
tion proposes a solution to the settlement bar problem that is consistent
with the goals of the federal securities laws. ° The Note concludes that
settlements made in good faith should bar contribution claims and that
the nonsettling defendants' liability should be reduced by the greater of
either the settlement amount, or the settling defendant's financial culpa-
6. Otherwise, a defendant has little incentive to settle. If a defendant's settlement with
the plaintiff does not sever liability to the nonsettling defendants, the settling defendant re-
mains potentially liable for the entire judgment by virtue of a cross-claim for contribution.
Therefore, because the settling defendant's potential liability vis-a-vis the ultimate judgment
remains unchanged, there is little incentive to settle with the plaintiff.
7. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
8. E.g., Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1329 (E.D. Cal. 1987); First Fed. Say. &
Loan v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 631 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Harrison
v. Sheats, 608 F. Supp. 502, 506 (E.D. Cal. 1985). See generally Adamski, Contribution and
Settlement in Multiparty Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 66 IOWA L. REV. 533 (1981) (evaluating
the contribution situation in lOb-5 cases and arguing that a new federal statute is needed).
9. The term "settlement bar" is used here to identify the situation in which a "settle-
ment prevents nonsettling defendants from getting contribution from settling ones." Donovan
v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1180 (7th Cir. 1984).
10. "[T]he goal of the [federal] securities laws is ... to compensate persons who have
been defrauded [and] to deter violations of those laws." Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
646 F.2d 721, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981).
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bility. This approach ensures the fairness of lOb-5 settlements, and pro-
tects the interests of the parties.
I. Development of the Private Cause of Action and
Contribution Under Rule 10b-5
To fully analyze settlement issues in the context of lOb-5 actions, the
judicial origins of the 10b-5 private right of action and the history of
contribution in 10b-5 suits should be considered. Although well-ac-
cepted today, a private citizen's remedy under Rule lOb-5, was not al-
ways as assured; rather, the lOb-5 private cause of action is the result of
judicial implication. This section briefly examines the origins of the pri-
vate cause of action under Rule lOb-5 and the ramifications of these judi-
cial beginnings.
A. The Private Cause of Action
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it
is unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Ex-
change] Commission may prescribe."1 Section 10(b) of the Act also
grants rulemaking power to the SEC, which the agency used to fashion
the broad anti-fraud prohibitions in Rule lOb-5.1 2
Unlike sections 9(e) 13 and 18(a) 14 of the Act, Rule lOb-5 does not
expressly provide a private remedy. 15 In 1946, however, a federal district
court in Pennsylvania found an "implicit" private cause of action under
Rule lOb-5 by applying tort analysis to the violation of the statute. 16
11. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (West 1981).
12. See supra note I for the text of Rule lOb-5.
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78i(e) (West 1981) (providing a private cause of action against one who
has engaged in market manipulation of securities subject to the 1934 Act's registration and
reporting mechanisms). See generally T. HAZEN, supra note 2, § 12.1 (discussing market ma-
nipulation and deceptive practices under sections 9, 10, 14(e), and 15(c) of the 1934 Act).
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r(a) (West 1981) (providing a private cause of action for investors
who have detrimentally relied on materially misleading statements or omissions of material
facts in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission). See generally T. HA-
ZEN, supra note 2, § 12.8 (discussing section 18(a) of the 1934 Act).
15. See generally Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities
Laws: 4 Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 783, 789 (1980) (evaluating the
development of private actions under the securities laws).
16. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The court stated:
"'The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if; (a) the intent of
the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect.'" Id. at 513 (quot-
ing the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934)).
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Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court expressly adopted this
view. 17
A private remedy for lOb-5 violations offers a valuable tool for in-
jured investors.1 8 First, it is easy to establish federal jurisdiction; for ex-
ample, it can attach from the mere use of a telephone in any part of a
securities transaction. 19 Thus, an injured investor almost always will be
able to seek a remedy in federal court. Second, through pendent jurisdic-
tion,20 a lOb-5 plaintiff may join related state claims to the lOb-5 claim
and bring them in federal court.2' Finally, Rule lOb-5 provides a cause
of action in many cases in which the common law offers no remedy, such
as material corporate misstatements or nondisclosures, 22 insider trad-
ing, 23  and corporate mismanagement involving transactions in
securities.
24
Having implied a private cause of action under lOb-5, courts have
had to develop federal common law to deal with issues ordinarily pro-
vided for by statute.25 These issues include the question of what consti-
17. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
18. See T. HAZEN, supra note 2, at 449 (discussing the importance of a private action
under 10b-5).
19. E.g., Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870, 874 (10th Cir. 1982) ("proof of intra state
telephonic messages in connection with the employment of deceptive devices or contrivances is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction in a § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action"); Kerbs v. Fall River In-
dus., 502 F.2d 731, 737 (10th Cir. 1974) ("It is not required ... that the manipulative or
deceptive ... be a part of or actually transmitted in the mails or instrumentality of interstate
commerce; it is sufficient that such device or contrivance be employed in connection with the
use of instruments of interstate commerce or the mails.") (emphasis in the original).
20. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (quoting U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2) ("Pendent jurisdiction . . . exists whenever there is a claim 'arising under [the]
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties . .. ' and the relationship between
that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional 'case.' ").
21. Walsh & Levine v. Peoria & E. R., 222 F. Supp. 516, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also
Lowenfels, Pendent Jurisdiction and the Federal Securities Acts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 474
(1967) (examining development of pendent jurisdiction in securities laws).
22. In re Union Carbide Class Action Sec. Litig., 648 F. Supp. 1322, 1326 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). See generally Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW.
887, 888-92 (1977).
23. The idea that insider trading might violate rule lOb-5 was expressed in In re Cady
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). This doctrine was first applied in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Corp., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic
Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under
SEC Rule lOb-5 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981) (analyzing the application of Rule lOb-5 to
insider trading on the basis of nonpublic information).
24. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1971) (Rule lOb-5 is violated when there is deception touching the purchase or sale of a
security even if the acts complained of amount to no more than corporate mismanagement).
25. It has been argued that Congress should enact procedures to fill gaps created by the
private cause of action under lOb-5. See, e.g., Adamski, supra note 8, at 572 ("A more satisfac-
tory solution to the problem of contribution and settlement under the securities laws would be
[Vol. 40
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tutes a "material fact" under lOb-5, 26 whether the plaintiff must prove
reliance on the misstatement or omission,27 how to measure damages,
28
and which statute of limitations to apply.29 Thus, judicial recognition
of a private cause of action under lOb-5 represents both a useful means of
administering justice and a source of unanswered questions. As the next
section describes, the absence of legislative guidance in the area of contri-
bution in lOb-5 situations has been particularly troublesome.
B. Contribution Under Rule 10b-5
The doctrine of contribution provides a positive effect by ensuring
fairness to named defendants and a deterrent effect by placing unnamed
defendants at risk of being joined in the litigation. Contribution causes
problems, however, in settlements of multiple defendant lOb-5 actions.
This section examines the doctrine of contribution, its effect on settling
multiple defendant suits, and judicial approaches to the problems caused
by contribution and settlement in 10b-5 actions.
(1) Contribution in General
Under the equitable doctrine of contribution "a person who dis-
charges a liability shared with another should not bear the sole burden of
payment."' 30 The doctrine allows defendants to require other tortfeasors,
even those not named by the plaintiff, to bear their fair portion of the
plaintiff's damage award.
3'
Historically, intentional joint tortfeasors were not able to seek con-
tribution from one another.32 Recent court decisions, however, have al-
federal legislation."). These gaps remain, however, not due to any fault of the legislature, but
as a result of the judicial creation of the private cause of action. It would seem, therefore, that
since the problem is judicially created, in the absence of legislative direction, it should be
judicially solved. Without statutory guidance, the courts have little choice but to look to the
common law.
26. In List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (quoting RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 538 (2)(a))., the court adopted the Restatement test: Whether a reasonable
person would "'attach importance [to the fact misrepresented] in determining his choice of
action.'" See also T. HAZEN, supra note 2, § 13.5 (discussing materiality under lOb-5).
27. See T. HAZEN, supra note 2, at 463-66 (discussing the requirement of reliance in
private lob-5 actions).
28. Id. § 13.7 (discussing the measurement of damages in private lob-5 actions).
29. Id. §. 13.8 (selection of statute of limitations in private lOb-5 actions).
30. Adamski, supra note 8, at 536. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON &
D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 50 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter "PROSSER AND
KEETON") (discussing contribution).
31. Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(3) (1977) ("There is no right of con-
tribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally caused the harm."). The intentional
tort analogy is appropriate in private lob-5 actions. The U.S. Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976), required that the defendant act with "intentional or
willful conduct."
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lowed contribution in this context. 33 These decisions are particularly
relevant in the lOb-5 area, since securities fraud, unlike negligent torts,
involves intentional wrongdoing. As one court has commented on this
new development:
[This] trend.., has been motivated primarily by two policy objectives:
fairness to defendants and deterrence. First, and probably most impor-
tantly, contribution achieves a more fair and equal distribution of jus-
tice by spreading plaintiffs' losses proportionally among all
wrongdoers.... Otherwise, under the traditional common law rule,
plaintiffs could unilaterally force one of many wrongdoers to bear the
entire loss, even though others may be equally or more to blame....
Second, contribution ensures that the deterrent effect of the law will be
felt by all persons contemplating liability, rather than just those per-
sons most likely to be named as defendants by the plaintiffs.
34
Although there is no express provision for contribution included in
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, a right to contribution has
been implied by the courts. Significantly, the same sections of the 1934
Act that created express private causes of action also provide for a statu-
tory right of contribution among persons liable. 35 The first court to ex-
amine the problem of contribution in 1Ob-5 actions noted the express
statutory provisions for contribution under 9(e) and 18(b) of the Act and
reasoned that because "the specific liability provisions of the Act provide
for contribution, it appears that contribution should be permitted when
liability is implied under Section 10(b). '' 3 6 Subsequent decisions have fol-
lowed this rationale. 37 Moreover, as another court has noted, the implied
33. Globus Inc. v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
("[T]he general drift of the law today is toward the allowance of contribution among joint
tortfeasors."). See also Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979) (contribution
is available in securities cases); Nelson, 662 F. Supp. at 1328 (defendants have implied rights of
contribution under the federal securities laws). See generally BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, CORP.
OFFICERS & DIR. § 12:32 (1984) (examining contribution under § 10(b)).
34. Nelson, 662 F. Supp. at 1328 (citations omitted).
35. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (West 1981).
36. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Company, 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Col. 1968),
modified on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
37. E.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1987); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 556-59 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
459 U.S. 375 (1983); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 646 F.2d 721, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1981);
Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). See also Right to Contribution Among
Defendants in Action Under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCA § 78(b)) or
SEC Rule lOb-5, 62 A.L.R. FED. 802-19 (1983) (analyzing cases finding contribution in lob-5
actions). But see In re Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 683 F. Supp. 1283, 1285-87 (1988)
(no implied right to contribution, by analogy to Supreme Court decisions regarding the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Sherman and Clay acts).
The Professional Management court ignored circuit court decisions to the contrary decided
after the Supreme Court cases in question.
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contribution right serves the twin purposes of the securities laws: fairness
to defendants and deterrence of violations.
38
(2) Effect of Contribution on Settlement of 10b-5 Claims
There are several reasons why settlement is desirable in private lOb-
5 actions. Partial settlements 39 in multiple defendant actions can pro-
mote judicial economy by creating pressure on the remaining defendants
to settle also. In addition, settlements may allow immediate compensa-
tion for plaintiffs. Settlements may also benefit the settling parties by
permitting them to drop out of the lawsuit and devote their time and
money to other matters.4°
Allowing contribution claims may hinder settlement. In Nelson v.
Bennett the court observed:
[E]ven if an individual defendant is willing to settle with plaintiffs, that
defendant would nevertheless remain subject to liability on the cross-
claims for contribution asserted by the non-settling defendants. In
other words, a settling defendant does not reduce its financial exposure
by entering into a partial settlement with plaintiffs and, therefore, has
little incentive to do so.41
If partial settlement does not extinguish the nonsettling defendant's
rights to contribution from the settling defendant, defendants will have
little reason to settle.42 In fact, if a settling defendant must continue to
protect his position against contribution claims from nonsettling defend-
ants, there may be a significant disincentive to settlement.4
3
Consequently, barring contribution claims should encourage settle-
ments. Under such a system, a partial settlement would "bar the nonset-
tling defendants from asserting cross-claims for contribution against the
settling defendant. A defendant contemplating settlement with plaintiff
38. Nelson, 662 F. Supp. at 1328. See also supra note 10.
39. The term "partial settlement" is used here to indicate the situation when, in a multi-
ple defendant action, there is a settlement with the plaintiff by fewer than all of the defendants.
40. Adamski, supra note 8, at 543.
41. Nelson, 662 F. Supp. at 1328-29. The court also stated, "While financial exposure
can, of course, be terminated by a full settlement between plaintiffs and all defendants, as a
practical matter a single, comprehensive settlement agreement is exceedingly difficult to
orchestrate in complex actions." Id. at 1329.
42. See, e.g., Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637 F.2d 672, 675
(9th Cir. 1980); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
43. E.g., McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines,
Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ("No defendant would settle with [a plaintiff] if
he was to find himself back in the suit as a third party defendant."); see also In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40, 41 (S.D. Tex.) aff'd per curiam, 606 F.2d 319 (5th
Cir. 1979) (stating that in settling antitrust claims, "[d]efendants have little incentive to buy
peace from plaintiffs if they may be obligated to litigate the same claim against other
defendants.").
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is thereby granted assurance that... it may fully 'buy its peace' through
such a settlement.
' '4 4
Several courts have considered barring contribution claims against
settling defendants in private lOb-5 actions. These courts disagree, how-
ever, as to the circumstances that justify imposing such a bar.45  Case
law suggests that courts will allow a partial settlement to bar contribu-
tion, subject to certain conditions.46 The courts have not, however,
clearly set out their preferred criteria for this determination. As one
court has recognized, "the caselaw does not forge a clear path to follow,
but merely provides a variety of alternatives. '47 The following section
examines the conditions under which courts are willing to bar contribu-
tion and the resulting effect on settlement.
II. Barring Contribution Claims After Partial Settlement
in 10b-5 Actions
Since barring contribution claims is likely to promote settlements
and the benefits derived from them, it is useful to examine the means by
which this goal can be achieved. Primarily, this analysis requires exami-
nation of state settlement bar statutes and their application in lOb-5
actions.
44. Nelson, 662 F. Supp. at 1329.
45. The courts have advanced the following views:
(1) Partial settlement does not bar contribution claims. Harrison v. Sheats, 608 F.
Supp. 502, 507 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
(2) Partial settlement should bar contribution subject to the forum state's tort settle-
ment bar statute. First Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 631 F.
Supp. 1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
(3) Partial settlement might bar contribution when settlement represents a "proper
share of damages." Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, 637
F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1980); see also In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., 661 F. Supp.
1403, 1408 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (non-settling defendants' rights of contribution are
barred "so long as the settlement represents the settling defendant's 'fair' or 'proper'
share of the damages sought"). This vague language has caused problems because
the court provided no guidance regarding what is meant by "fair" or "proper." In-
deed, the central question is how to encourage settlement while ensuring equity.
(4) Partial settlement should bar contribution as prescribed by a new principle of
federal common law announced by court. Nelson, 662 F. Supp. at 1338-39. The
Nelson court, recognizing the anomalous results that would occur without a uniform
federal standard, took it on themselves to proclaim what that standard would be.
46. Harrison v. Sheats, 608 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Cal. 1985), in which the court refused to
bar contribution, appears to be an anomaly. First, subsequent cases in the district have held
that, under the right circumstances, partial settlement will bar contribution. See, e.g., Nelson,
662 F. Supp. at 1338. Second, the Harrison court merely considered that Congress intended to
allow a right to contribution. In view of this implied statutory right, the court refused to bar
contribution. Harrison, 608 F. Supp. at 506. Finally, the court recognized that, depending on
the outcome of the trial, the non-settling defendants might be entitled to contribution. Id. at
507.
47. Nelson, 662 F. Supp. at 1333.
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A. State Settlement Bar Statutes
The absence of a federal statute governing a partial settlement's ef-
fect on contribution under lOb-5 requires courts to look to other sources
of law. One of the most helpful sources of law is state tort settlement bar
statutes.
(1) The Three Types of Settlement Bar Statutes
General tort settlement bar statutes have been enacted by twenty-
four states.48 These statutes fall into three categories: those based on the
1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, those founded on
the 1975 version of that Act, and those enacted by California and New
York, which do not precisely follow either version of the Act, but which
are substantially similar to them.
In states with statutes based on the 1939 version of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,49 partial settlement bars contribu-
tion if the amount of the settlement reduces the nonsettling defendant's
ultimate liability.50 These statutes bar contribution only if the settling
defendant receives a release before the nonsettling defendant receives the
right to secure a monetary judgment. Also, the contribution bar requires
that the settlement reduce the plaintiff's award in any subsequent judg-
ment by the settling defendant's pro rata share.5'
48. The following is a comprehensive list of state settlement bar statutes: ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.16.040 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-61-205 (1987); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6
(West Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6304
(1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-15 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 6-806 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302 (Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art.
50, § 20 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, § 4 (West 1986); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.060 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.245 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-5 (1986); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (1983); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-38-04 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 832 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.455 (1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8327 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-8 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-8-18 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105 (1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (1984).
49. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 5, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1939). A typi-
cal provision reads:
A release by the injured of one (1) joint tortfeasor does not relieve him from liability
to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor unless the release is given before the
right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment for contribution has ac-
crued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share of the released
tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other
tortfeasors.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-61-205 (1987).
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-61-205 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 6304 (1975); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 663-15 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 6-806 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 20
(1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-5 (1986); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8327 (Purdon 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-8 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 15-8-18 (1984).
51. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-61-205 (1987).
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In providing that reduction is available only "to the extent of the
pro rata share of the released tortfeasor," these statutes actually may
have "discourage[d] settlements in joint tort cases by making it impossi-
ble for one tortfeasor alone to take a release and close the file."' 52 Since
the "pro rata share" cannot be determined in advance of a judgment
against the other defendants, the plaintiffs cannot appreciate the effect a
settlement might have on their total recovery.
53
A second category of settlement bar statutes, based on the later ver-
sion of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,54 were en-
acted in response to these deficiencies. 55 Under these statutes, a partial
settlement made in "good faith" completely bars contribution from the
settling defendant. 56 The Commissioners' comments accompanying the
Uniform Act state that "[t]he requirement that the release or covenant be
given in good faith gives the court occasion to determine whether the
transaction was collusive, and if so there is no discharge. '57 Under this
scheme, so long as the settlement is made in good faith, the judgment is
reduced by the dollar amount of the settlement and further claims for
contribution against the settling defendants are barred.
Finally, two states chose not to follow either version of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, but enacted statutes of their own
design. Both of these statutes, however, contain a requirement of "good
52. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98, 99 (1975)
(commissioners' comment).
53. Id. By the same token, settling defendants do not know if they remain liable until the
case is over and the settlement is compared to their pro rata share of the judgment. Thus, they
gain little or nothing by settling.
54. Id. § 1, 12 U.L.A. at 63.
55. ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, Para. 302 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231B, § 4 (West 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 17.245 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04 (1976); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 832 (West Supp. 1988); OR.
REV. STAT. § 18.455 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105 (1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
35.1 (1984).
56. For example:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good
faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury . . .[i]t shall
discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any
other tortfeasor.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, § 4 (West 1986).
57. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98, 99 (1975)
(commissioners' comment).
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faith," s58 and otherwise operate in the same manner as statutes based on
the 1975 Uniform Act. 59
(2) Application of State Settlement Bar Statutes to Private 10b-5 Actions-
Should State or Federal Law Govern?
The focus will now turn to the mechanism the courts must use in
adopting state settlement bar statutes as the rule of law, or alternatively,
pronouncing federal common law. Typically, contribution claims arise
under state law. It might appear, then, that state substantive rules re-
garding the effect of settlements on contribution in lOb-5 actions would
apply.60 Certain "areas of judicial decision," however, "[are] ... so dom-
inated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they
affect must be deemed governed by federal law."'61 Applying this princi-
ple, the court in Globus v. Law Research Service Inc. 62 determined that
since the sections of the Securities Exchange Act that provided express
civil remedies also contain express provisions for contribution, there
must be contribution under lOb-5. Thus, the court found an implied
right of contribution just as a previous court had found an implied pri-
vate cause of action under lOb-5.
Furthermore, the court held that contribution under Rule lOb-5 is
governed by federal law.63 Contribution in these cases does not involve
federal pendent jurisdiction over a state common law claim. Rather,
these cases present an independent cause of action implied from the Se-
58. Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint
tortfeasors . . . shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a
settlement entered into by the plaintiff... and one or more alleged tortfeasors.... A
determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any
other joint tortfeasor ... from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1989).
"A release given in good faith by the injured person to one tortfeasor. . . relieves him
from liability to any other person for contribution." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (Mc-
Kinney 1978).
59. California's statute differs by providing the right to a hearing on the issue of good
faith. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1989).
60. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.... There is no federal general common
law." Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
61. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co. 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). In Sola, a patent
dispute was brought in federal court based on diversity of citizenship. The court held that
federal, rather than state, law governs whether the licensee is estopped from raising the de-
fenses that the patent was invalid or that the license agreement violated the federal antitrust
laws.
62. 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.
1971).
63. Id. at 958 n.2. ("There is no basis for doubting that the subject of contribution.., is
governed here by federal law [under § 10(b)].")
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curities Exchange Act.64 It is helpful to examine the rationale for apply-
ing a uniform federal rule of contribution, however, because the issue has
not been definitively resolved.
The federal court first created a rule of federal common law in
Clearfield Trust. 65 Clearfield involved a suit by the United States against
a Pennsylvania bank for the bank's guaranty of a forged endorsement.
Under Pennsylvania law, the government's claim was estopped. The
court held that the government was not subject to Pennsylvania law.
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, found that the federal govern-
ment's authority to issue checks was grounded in the Constitution and
not dependent on the law of any state. Therefore, "[t]he duties imposed
upon the United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the
issuance [must] find their roots in the same federal sources."' 66 Thus,
when a rule of law is required to resolve rights and duties arising under
federal law, the federal courts may fashion the necessary rule of decision
by pronouncing federal common law.
67
Courts are not compelled to ignore state law, however, when issues
require application of federal common law. Federal courts may decide
that state law on a particular matter is a more appropriate choice and
may adopt it as a federal rule of decision. In United States. v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc. 65 the Supreme Court provided a test for lower courts to use in
determining whether to formulate uniform federal common law under
Clearfield or to adopt state law as the federal rule of decision. The test
states that, "federal programs that 'by their nature are and must be uni-
64. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 557 (5th Cir. 1981) aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) ("Because the Rule lOb-5 action is implied
in a federal statute, the right to contribution under Rule lob-5 is determined by federal law.").
See generally Note, Globus: A Prolific Generator of Nice Questions, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 898 (au-
thored by Tom H. Connolly) (examining the development and application of federal common
law to securities litigation, and exploring the implications of a federal common law right to
contribution).
65. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) ("In the absence of an
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law
according to their own standards.").
66. Id. at 366.
67. While Clearfield involved an action on a federal contract, the principle has been ap-
plied in tort cases as well. E.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-11 (1947)
(suit for injury to U.S. serviceman); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 173-87 (1949) (the mean-
ing of the word "negligence" in the Federal Employers Liability Act is determined by federal
law even though the act itself does not define the word). At the extreme, the Supreme Court
held in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), that a statute that gave
federal jurisdiction over suits by unions involving collective bargaining agreements required
the federal courts to formulate an entire body of substantive federal law. See generally
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of Na-
tional and State Rulesfor Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957) (analyzing the application
of the rule in Clearfield).
68. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
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form in character throughout the Nation' necessitate formulation of con-
trolling federal rules. . . . Conversely, when there is little need for a
nationally uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the
federal rule of decision."
'69
In First Federal Savings & Loan v. Oppenheim Appel, Dixon & Co.,
70
the Southern District Court of New York applied the Kimbell test to a
lOb-5 situation and determined that each district court should apply the
local forum's law in lOb-5 actions. The court stated that it could "think
of no compelling reason why a uniform national rule would be necessary
to effectuate the federal regulatory program. '71 Additionally, the court
observed that state statutes of limitations are often incorporated as the
rule of decision for federal securities claims.72 Finally, the court noted
the uncertainty of a situation in which there are both federal and state
claims at stake. The application of federal law to the lOb-5 claim and
state law to the state action could create difficulty in sorting out a jury's
damage award.73 The court concluded that the forum state settlement
bar statute74 should be applied in lOb-5 actions.
75
The Central District Court of California, however, took a contrary
position in Nelson v. Bennett.76 In Nelson, a group of lOb-5 defendants
offered to settle with the plaintiffs, subject to the condition that the court
would dismiss all contribution claims against the settling defendants. As
in First Federal, a key issue was whether the court should use the state
settlement bar statute or recognize federal common law. Applying the
Kimbell test, the Nelson court determined that the First Federal reliance
on the forum state settlement bar statute was inappropriate. The Nelson
court held that there were "at least three compelling reasons why a uni-
form national [settlement bar] rule would be necessary."' 77 First, contri-
69. Id. at 728 (citations omitted).
70. 631 F. Supp. 1029, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
71. Id. at 1036.
72. Id. at 1036 n.l1. The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
210 n.29 (1976), stated that since no statute of limitations is provided for in § 10(b) actions, the
statute of limitations of the forum state should be followed.
73. 631 F. Supp. at 1036 (S.D. N.Y. 1986) ("Where a federal securities law and a state
law claim are based on the same tortious conduct ... it is not clear how disparate rules of
contribution ... would be applied to a jury's verdict awarding identical damages on both
claims.").
74. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1978).
75. The court also observed that other courts in the second circuit had applied the New
York settlement bar statute. See, eg., Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180,
1189 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("On balance... the better approach for a federal court would be
to look to state law concerning contribution and its underlying principles. If these principles
sufficiently vindicate the federal policy concerning contribution, they should be adopted. In-
deed, absent a federal statute the parameters of contribution in relation to settling tortfeasors
should not be defined in a vacuum.").
76. 662 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
77. Id. at 1336.
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bution bar rules "affect[ ] key substantive rights of the defendants under
the federal securities laws."'7 8 Second, the Nelson court felt that applica-
tion of state settlement bar statutes would lead to disparate results. The
court observed that some states do not have any law barring contribution
from settling defendants. 79 Thus, if federal courts sitting in those states
tried to apply the forum's law, any federal right of contribution would be
destroyed. Finally, the court found that a state-by-state rule would en-
courage forum shopping and generate "wasteful conflicts of law litigation
... to determine which state's settlement bar statute applies." 80
The Nelson court makes a more persuasive argument. 8' If contribu-
tion is to serve its federal purposes of assuring fairness and deterring lOb-
5 violations, 82 it should be enforced without regard to the locus of the
lOb-5 violation. In light of the potential for inconsistent verdicts and
forum shopping, either the courts or Congress must declare a uniform
rule on the settlement bar question, and not rely on the settlement bar
scheme set out in the forum state's statute. The next section will demon-
strate that, in spite of conflicting directions, common themes emerge that
may guide the development of such a rule.
B. The Good Faith Requirement
(1) Good Faith and State Settlement Bar Statutes
There is agreement among the courts, the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, and the state settlement bar statutes, that, sub-
ject to a condition of "rightness," a partial settlement will release the
settling defendant from further liability both to the plaintiff and to the
nonsettling defendants. 83 For all practical purposes, "rightness" entails
that a settlement must be entered into in "good faith."' 84 In fact, the
1975 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and the state settle-
78. Id.
79. Id. The court also noted that at the time of the decision only twenty-two states had
some form of settlement bar statute. Id. at n.20.
80. Id. at 1337. The court took special note of the fact that adoption of local statutes of
limitations have resulted in such problems, citing several commentators. See, e.g., Committee
on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report on the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for
Implied Actions, 41 Bus. LAW. 65, 647 (1986) ("The uncertainty and lack of uniformity pro-
mote forum shopping by plaintiffs and result in wholly unjustified disparities in the rights of
parties litigating identical claims in different states.").
81. This position was acknowledged by In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1257
(E.D. Pa. 1988) ("a uniform federal rule is desirable here").
82. See supra note 10.
83. See supra notes 45-47, 48-59 and accompanying text.
84. Unfortunately, there is no uniform standard for "good faith." This section will ex-
amine how the general concept is found throughout the acts, and will later establish a model
standard for the determination of good faith in private lOb-5 actions. See infra notes 96-99
and accompanying text.
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ment bar statutes that follow its scheme, explicitly require good faith.85
Likewise, California and New York, which have chosen to draft their
own settlement bar statutes, expressly require settlements to be in good
faith.8
6
State settlement bar statutes based on the 1939 Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act, however, do not require good faith as a
specific prerequisite to barring contribution claims. The commissioners
on Uniform State Law lessened the likelihood of a bad faith settlement by
reducing any judgment according to the relative culpability of the set-
tling defendant instead of the dollar amount of the settlement. As the
commissioners for the 1975 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act explained this part of the 1939 scheme:
The idea underlying the 1939 provision was that the plaintiff should
not be permitted to release one tortfeasor from his fair share of liability
and mulct another instead, from motives of sympathy or spite, or be-
cause it might be easier to collect from one than from the other; and
that the release from contribution affords too much opportunity for
collusion between plaintiff and the released tortfeasor against the one
not released. 8
7
In short, the framers of the 1939 Uniform Act sought to ensure good
faith settlements by placing the plaintiff at risk of not receiving full col-
lection of the judgment.
Although California's settlement bar statute does not follow either
of the Uniform Acts, the California Supreme Court has enunciated a val-
uable method for determining good faith under any scheme. 88 In Tech-
Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 89 the court reasoned that to determine
the presence of good faith, it must first decide "whether the amount of
the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's
proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries." 90
The court observed that a showing of "good faith" is not merely the
opposite of a showing of "bad faith." 91 On the contrary, even an appar-
ently low settlement might be in good faith because the task of quanti-
fying damages is often difficult because a disproportionately low sum
may be reasonable if the tortfeasor is insolvent or uninsured.92
85. See supra note 57.
86. See supra note 58.
87. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98, 99 (commis-
sioners' comment (1975)).
88. But see Foley, Settling Out of a Multiparty Case: Tech-Bilt Leaves the 'Good Faith
Standard' as Vague as Ever, 5 CAL. LAW., Oct. 1985, at 25 (arguing that the court's standard
does not improve the understanding of good faith).
89. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256, 698 P.2d 159 (1985).
90. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
91. Id.
92. Id., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263, 698 P.2d at 167 (quoting Stambach v. Superior Court, 62
Cal. App. 3d 231, 238 (1976)).
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The court cautioned, however, that the amount of the settlement is
relevant to a determination of good faith,93 stating that, "[a] defendant's
settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reason-
able person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling
defendant's liability to be."' 94 The court also imposed a requirement that
a decision regarding good faith be made solely on the basis of the infor-
mation available at the time of the determination.
9 5
Like the 1939 and 1975 versions of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act and the state statutes based upon them, the fed-
eral common law settlement bar rule should bar contribution in multiple
defendant lOb-5 actions when a defendant wishes to settle with the plain-
tiff, subject to a judicial determination of good faith. The Tech-Bilt stan-
dard for determining good faith is a logical and flexible rule appropriate
for application in the context of lOb-5 settlements.
(2) Good Faith in lOb-5 Actions
Although the Nelson v. Bennett court denounced the wisdom of ap-
plying the California settlement bar statute in lOb-5 cases, 96 its solution
paralleled that of Tech-Bilt. The similarity is apparent in the Nelson
court's expression of the factors to consider in determining good faith:
"the possible uncollectibility of any larger judgment which might be en-
tered against the settling defendants, the adequacy of the settlement
amount in light of the comparative culpability of the settling defendants
and the uncertainties of establishing such liability."
'97
In antitrust cases, federal courts have reached similar conclusions
regarding the propriety of settlements. For example, the Fifth Circuit, in
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,98 examined the settle-
ment problem and established a standard of good faith for antitrust set-
tlements similar to the standard expressed in Tech-Bilt and Nelson:
First the district court must evaluate the likelihood that plaintiffs
would prevail at trial. Second, the district court must establish a range
93. Id., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263, 698 P.2d at 166-67.
94. Id., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263, 698 P.2d at 167 (quoting Torres v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,
157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825, 832 (1984)).
95. Id., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263, 698 P.2d at 167. See also City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 456 (2d Cir. 1974) (citations omitted):
It cannot be overemphasized that neither the trial court in approving the settlement
nor this Court in reviewing that approval have the right or the duty to reach any
ultimate conclusions on the issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the
dispute. It is well settled that in the judicial consideration of proposed settlement,
'the [trial] judge does not try out or attempt to decide the merits of the controversy'
S.. and the appellate court 'need not and should not reach any dispositive conclu-
sions on the admittedly unsettled legal issues.'
96. Nelson v. Bennett, 662 F. Supp. 1324, 1338 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
97. Id.
98. 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981).
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of possible recovery that plaintiffs would realize if they prevailed at
trial. And third, guided by its findings on plaintiffs' likelihood of pre-
vailing on the merits and such other factors as may be relevant, the
district court must establish, in effect, the point on, or if appropriate,
below, the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair and
adequate.
99
Thus, Tech-Bilt, Nelson, and Corrugated developed a standard that
looks to the plaintiff's potential trial recovery and then establishes the
point of good faith settlement. This "good faith point" is determined by
a variety of factors: (1) an examination of the likelihood and degree of
culpability of the settling defendant to protect the interests of the non-
settling defendants by avoiding disproportionately low settlements; (2) an
examination of the settling defendant's financial ability to ensure that the
settlement amount adequately compensates the plaintiff and has a suffi-
cient deterrent effect; and (3) an evaluation of the circumstances sur-
rounding the settlement to avoid the possibility of collusion, fraud, or
other tortious conduct.
The emerging federal common law settlement bar determination of
good faith should adopt these factors for application in lOb-5 cases. The
court first should determine the range of the plaintiff's possible trial re-
covery. The court then should compare the proposed settlement amount
to the range of fair and adequate settlements. Such a determination
should consider several factors, including: the settlor's likely proportion-
ate liability; the settlement amount; the financial conditions and insur-
ance policy limits of settling defendants; and the existence of collusion,
fraud or other tortious conduct.
III. Apportioning the Judgment Among Nonsettling Defendants
If the remaining defendants' rights to contribution are barred, a
mechanism for equitably adjusting the plaintiffs' ultimate judgment must
be created. This device is necessary to protect the non-settling defend-
ants from having to pay more than their fair share of the judgment. In
this section three methods of apportioning lOb-5 judgments are de-
scribed. The discussion then focuses on the two most commonly applied
methods and their effects on the litigation process. The section concludes
with a proposal for the correct allocation of risks and benefits.
A. Methods of Apportioning 10b-5 Judgments
Three approaches to apportioning responsibility for paying a plain-
tiff's damage award have been used by the courts in 1Ob-5 actions. A pro
rata approach divides the judgment equally among settling and nonset-
tling defendants. Relative culpability divides the award according to the
fault of each defendant. A pro tanto approach reduces the judgment by
99. Id. at 212.
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the settlement amount, then apportions it among the nonsettling defend-
ants. Each approach involves a different "price" paid by the settling
plaintiff. The plaintiff either will give up the settling defendant's pro rata
liability, the settling defendant's relative culpability, or the portion of his
claim precisely equal to the dollar amount of the settlement.
(1) Pro Rata Allocation
In early lOb-5 cases, liability among defendants often was deter-
mined by the pro rata method. 100 Under this scheme, the judgment is
divided evenly among all culpable defendants whether they have settled
or not. If a partial settlement is reached, the total liability of any remain-
ing defendants is reduced by the pro rata share of any settling defend-
ants. For example, in a suit by P against Dl and D2, if D1 settles for
$100,000, and then P receives a judgment for $500,000, D2s liability will
be $250,000 and P will recover $350,00.101 The framers of the 1939 Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act adopted the pro rata ap-
proach. 1 0 2 Although pro rata is administered easily, it has been widely
criticized as unfair, since it places equal liability on parties who are not
necessarily equally culpable.
10 3
One commentator has suggested that the use of the pro rata ap-
proach in lOb-5 settlement cases is the result of three factors: its wide
use at common law, its ease of administration, and the use of the phrase
"as in cases of contract" by sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, which expressly provide for contribution. 104 As these sec-
tions state, "Every person who becomes liable to make payment under
this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any
person who, if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make
the same payment."'
' 0 5
Courts initially understood the phrase to mean that the pro rata
method used in common law contract cases should be applied to securi-
ties cases as well. 10 6 In Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co.,
100. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971).
101. The $500,000 judgment is divided evenly between the two original defendants. See
Adamski, supra note 8, at 555.
102. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Adamski, supra note 8, at 557; Block & Barton, Contribution and Indemnifi-
cation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 351, 359-60 (1984); Fischer, Con-
tribution in lob-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1821, 1833-34 (1978).
104. Fischer, supra note 103, at 1829 (footnote omitted). The expression "as in cases of
contract" is found in § 9(e) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78i(e) (West
1981).
105. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (West 1981) (emphasis added).
106. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspir-
acy, In Pari Delecto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 650 (1972).
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however, the court held that the phrase did not .necessarily mandate pro
rata allocation.107 In Gould, a defendant who was required to surrender
profits acquired in violation of the securities laws cross-claimed against
settling defendants. In rejecting a strict application of the pro rata rule,
the court first observed that multiple defendants to a common law con-
tract action need not always receive pro rata contribution.108 Second, the
court determined that the phrase "in case of contract" was intended to
exclude tort law from the contribution analysis. Instead of the common
law tort rule that intentional joint tortfeasors are not entitled to contribu-
tion, the Gould court believed the phrase mandates use of the common
law contract rule that allows for contribution. 109 Thus, the Gould court
held that the phrase was not intended to establish a method of allocation,
but rather to establish contribution in the first instance. The court thus
refused to blindly apply the pro rata method.1 0 One commentator has
stated, "[t]he teaching of Gould is that federal courts will not be bound
inflexibly to a pro rata measure of contribution."'
(2) Relative Culpability
In view of more recent developments regarding the apportionment
of a partial settlement, the pro rata method no longer presents a viable
solution to apportioning liability among nonsettling defendants. Starting
with McLean v. Alexander, 2 courts began to develop the policy of rela-
tive culpability. In McLean, all of the defendants who had sold stock to
the plaintiff settled. The sole remaining defendant was an accountant
who had audited the books. A judgment was entered that far exceeded
the amount the other defendants had paid in settlement. The court
found the accountant only ten percent culpable and refused to use the
pro rata allocation of fifty percent, recognizing a "vast difference" in the
relative culpability of the defendants. The court maintained that dam-
ages should be apportioned on the basis of relative fault,' '3 viewing this
method as the "modem approach,"' '4 and criticizing the pro rata stan-
dard as having "more mathematical than judicial integrity."" 5
In the recent case of Smith v. Mulvaney,"16 the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined pro rata allocation of liability, but determined that the proper
107. 387 F. Supp. 163, 170 (D. Del. 1974).
108. Id. at 171.
109. Id. at 170.
110. Gould, 387 F. Supp. at 170.
111. Fischer, supra note 103, at 1830.
112. 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.
1979).
113. Id. at 1272.
114. Id. at 1274.
115. Id. at 1273.
116. 827 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1987).
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measure should be relative culpability.' 17 The court stated that the Mc-
Lean court's criticism of the pro rata method "[A]ppears especially ap-
propriate in securities fraud cases which include numerous defendants
with potentially vast differences in culpability. Contribution is an equi-
table doctrine. To apportion damages without regard to fault reduces, to
an extent, the equity which the doctrine was intended to provide."'"18
Applying the relative culpability rule to the previous example in
which Dl settles for $100,000 and P receives a judgment for $500,000, if
D1 were determined to be 40% culpable, D2 would be liable to P for
$300,000 (60% of the judgment) without regard for the amount of Dl's
settlement. Determination of the ultimate relative culpability is made at
trial, not at the time of the settlement. To effectuate a settlement, the
court only need determine that the settlement is in good faith and that
the amount is within the range of reasonable, expected settlements." 19
(3) Pro Tanto Allocation
The potential difficulty of determining a settling defendant's liability
gives rise to a third method of allocating the effects of a settlement. The
1975 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act 120 presents an ap-
proach that simply reduces the nonsettling defendant's liability by the
dollar amount of the settlement. "Any judgment against the remaining
defendant is reduced pro tanto, that is, by the amount actually paid in
settlement."' 2' Thus, in the above example, a $100,000 settlement by
D1 would reduce D2s liability by $100,000 to $400,000. If there is more
than one nonsettling defendant, the reduced judgment is divided among
them after trial.
Although pro tanto does not expressly consider each defendant's in-
dividual liability, as does relative culpability, it has been argued that a
pro tanto rule would produce more equitable settlements. According to
this view, the pro tanto rule "provides an inducement to fair settlements,
yet at the same time allows for sufficient judicial supervision of the terms
of the settlement that the rights of nonsettling defendants are not
prejudiced or diminished.... It would appear that a 'good faith' require-
ment [for settlement] would adequately safeguard the interest of the non-
settling defendants."'
122
Since the developing federal common law settlement bar rule seems
to be moving towards a good faith requirement, including a judicial de-
117. Id. at 561.
118. Id.
119. This is the direct application of the good faith standard. See supra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text.
120. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
121. Adamski, supra note 8, at 548-49.
122. Fischer, supra note 103, at 1834.
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termination that the settlement is within the range of reasonable settle-
ment amounts, 123 pro tanto appears to be a reasonable and fair means of
apportionment in lOb-5 cases. Several cases have taken this approach. 124
Nevertheless, from the nonsettling defendant's vantage, a pretrial deci-
sion of a settlement's reasonableness may not be a satisfactory solution.
Essentially, the pro tanto approach requires her to rely on the other par-
ties to protect her interests during the settlement process. The next sec-
tion describes how the allocation of the settlement amount to the final
judgment can have a substantial effect on the nonsettling defendants' lia-
bility to the plaintiff.
B. The Effect of Apportionment on the Remaining Parties
Both the relative culpability and the pro tanto methods of appor-
tioning settlements significantly affect the character of the litigation. The
risk that the settlement is correct shifts among the parties, depending on
which method of allocation is used. This section examines the effect each
of the currently predominant methods, relative culpability and pro tanto,
have on the parties.
(1) Effect of Relative Culpability
If the relative culpability of a settling defendant reduces a nonset-
tling defendant's ultimate liability the nonsettling defendant will be no
worse off than if no settlement had occurred. "This approach has the
advantage of preventing the unfairness to the nonsettlor inherent in the
pro tanto approach, since the nonsettling defendant will not be required
to bear a disproportionately large share of plaintiff's total damages." 125
Under this system, the plaintiff will not necessarily receive the full
value of any ultimate judgment. If the settlement amount is less than the
relative culpability of the settling defendant, the plaintiff's recovery will
be that much less. In short, the relative culpability approach allocates to
the plaintiff the risk that the settlement amount is less than the settling
defendant's culpability. On the other hand, blind application of the rela-
tive culpability approach could result in a windfall to the plaintiff should
the settlement amount exceed the settling defendant's relative culpability
123. See notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1263 (10th Cir.
1988) (holding that lower court's awarding of setoff of settlement amount was not clearly
erroneous); Knox v. County of Los Angeles, 109 Cal. App. 3d 825, 836, 167 Cal. Rptr. 463,
469 (1980) (absent good faith allocation of settlement amounts, defendants were entitled to
setoff of entire settlement); Dionese v. City of West Palm Beach, 500 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla.
1987) (in absence of specific allocations in settlement agreement, the total amount of the settle-
ment must be set off from the entire verdict).
125. Adamski, supra note 8, at 551-52.
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share of the judgment. In Doyle v. United States, 126 a wrongful death
action involving contribution and settlement issues, the court stated:
The better rule, this court feels, is to respect the aleatory nature of the
settlement process and to hold both the plaintiff and settling defendant
to their gamble. The plaintiff gambles that the amount he receives in
settlement plus the amount recoverable from the non-settling defend-
ant will be greater than he could have recovered if he pursued both
actions to a judgment (i.e., the plaintiff hopes the settling defendant
will pay more than what is eventually determined to be his propor-
tional share of the damages). The settling defendant gambles that the
amount he pays in settlement is less than he ultimately would be liable
to pay, had he gone to judgment.1
27
There are three significant problems with the relative culpability sys-
tem. First, the plaintiff does not know precisely what she is bargaining
for, since she does not know the parties' relative culpabilities until a judg-
ment is received.128 Second, relative culpability requires the court even-
tually to determine the actual culpability of the settling defendant, thus
negating some of the judicial economy benefits of settlement. Third, the
settling defendant will not be a party to the determination of relative
culpability. Thus, to obtain the lowest possible liability, the nonsettling
defendants will argue that the settling defendant is more culpable than
the amount indicated by the settlement. As a result, the plaintiff is
forced to take the position of the settling defendant, effectively, switching
sides. In order to obtain the largest possible recovery from the now set-
tling defendants, the plaintiff must minimize the settling defendant's cul-
pability by arguing that the settlement was at least an adequate
representation of the settling defendant's relative culpability.
29
A benefit of the relative culpability method is that it "is unlikely that
a plaintiff will voluntarily settle for an intentionally low amount with one
wrongdoer, knowing that any judgment against the remaining defendants
will be reduced by the settling defendant's share of total damages."' 30 In
other words, the mechanics of relative culpability make fraud and collu-
sion between the plaintiff and the defendant unlikely.
While the court's determination of relative culpability of an absent
party may be burdensome and lead to administrative inefficiency, this
problem may not be significant. The district court in McLean v. Alexan-
126. 441 F. Supp. 701 (D. S.C. 1977).
127. Id. at 711 n.5.
128. See generally Comment, Contribution and the Distribution of Loss Among
Tortfeasors, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 203, 241-45 (1975) (authored by Bruce A Zimet).
129. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 192, 124 N.W.2d 106, 112 (1963) (the rela-
tive culpability of the settling defendant can be determined without requiring the settlor to be a
party to the litigation).
130. Adamski, supra note 8, at 553.
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der13 1 found that determining relative culpability was "only minimally
more difficult" than applying a pro rata approach.132 The court need not
be concerned with the good faith or reasonableness of the settlement,
since the settlors will protect their own interests, and the nonsettlors will
not be affected by the settlement. Any inefficiencies in determining the
culpability of the settlor will be balanced by the efficiency of a less rigor-
ous, pretrial hearing for good faith.
(2) Effect of Pro Tanto
The most appealing aspect of the pro tanto approach to settlement
allocation is its ease of administration. 133 The court need not determine
the exact relative culpability of the settling defendant. Rather, the court
need only find that the settlement is within the range of reasonable settle-
ment amounts, and thus in good faith.' 34 Additionally, because the
plaintiff's total recovery equals the judgment amount, the plaintiff will
not receive any more than a single satisfaction.135 Application of the pro
tanto rule thus provides for an efficient allocation of the effects of settle-
ment, and also ensures that the plaintiff receives a full, fair, and single
satisfaction.
On the other hand, if a nonsettling defendant's liability is reduced by
the pro tanto dollar amount of the settlement, that defendant could be
worse off than if there had been no settlement at all. The nonsettling
defendant would be forced to depend on the court's pretrial determina-
tion of good faith to protect her interests. Thus, the pro tanto system.
"may lead to collusion between the plaintiff and settling defendant, since
the plaintiff-who will be.able to collect total damages less the settlement
amount from the remaining defendants-theoretically has nothing to
131. 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grouids, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d. Cir.
1§79).
132. Id. at 1276. The court considered the following factors in determining relative culpa-
bility: "the defendant's extent of involvement, duration of involvement, knowledge of entire
scheme to defraud, intent, extent of.his contribution toward causation of the losses and benefit
received." Id. at n.84.
133. "The settlement payment is merely deducted from any judgment against the nonset-
tlor without regard to the culpability of the settlor." Adamski, supra note 8, at 549 n.105.
134. As required in the good faith hearing. A determination of good faith in the pro tanto
approach not only protects less culpable nonsettling defendants, but also ensures the deterrent
effect of the laws.
135. The "single satisfaction" rule is a common law doctrine which holds that a plaintiff is
entitled to only one satisfaction for the joint wrongs of others. See generally PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra note 30, at § 48. Thus, any amount received from one joint tortfeasor will
reduce the liability of any other tortfeasors, such that the plaintiff will receive only a single
compensation for the wrong. "The effect of this rule is that, unless further adjustment is made,
the nonsettlor benefits by having to pay proportionately less whenever the settlor has paid
more than his subsequently adjudged share of plaintiff's damages." Adamski, supra note 8, at
564 (footnote omitted).
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lose by accepting an inadequate sum in settlement."1 36 In addition, "the
pro tanto approach would allow the plaintiff [rather than the jury] to
select, subject only to meeting the good faith test, which of several
wrongdoers should bear the major burden of payment for the
violation." 137
In short, the pro tanto approach provides an easily administered
system favorable to the plaintiff. Under the pro tanto approach, the
plaintiff does no worse in settlement than in trial, 138 and the risk of a bad
settlement is shifted to the nonsettling defendants. Note, however, that
this rule appears unfair to the nonsettling defendants. As each defendant
settles, each of the remaining defendants potentially becomes liable for a
larger and larger share of the final judgment.
(3) Allocation of Risk and Benefits
The primary difference between the relative culpability and pro
tanto methods lies in the allocation of risk between the plaintiff and the
nonsettling defendants. In a relative culpability allocation scheme, the
risk of an inadequate settlement falls on the plaintiff. Under this scheme,
it is in the plaintiff's interest to make a settlement close to the settling
defendant's liability so that the plaintiff's total recovery is not overly re-
duced. Conversely, the pro tanto scheme places this risk on the nonset-
tling defendants because an inadequate settlement increases their own
liability.
Another perspective on the distinctions between the two methods
focuses on their comparative benefits. Thus, under the relative culpabil-
ity system, the possibility of collusion between plaintiff and settling de-
fendant is virtually nonexistent, and the nonsettling defendants' interests
are completely protected. The pro tanto system has appeal in its simplic-
ity of administration and in its guarantee that the plaintiff will receive
neither more nor less than the amount of the judgment.
39
In light of the above analysis, a hybrid system that maximizes the
benefits, yet minimizes the shortcomings appears to be the best solution.
136. Adamski, supra note 8, at 549.
137. Id. at 551.
138. There are three possible scenarios in a pro tanto allocation of settlement: First, the
settlement could be an amount that is equal to or less than the ultimate judgment. Second, the
settlement could be an amount in excess of the ultimate judgment. Finally, a settlement may
be made and the court may find against the plaintiff at trial. In the first case, the plaintiff will
receive exactly the amount of the judgment, either entirely from the settling defendant, or
collectively from the settling and nonsettling defendants. In the second situation, the plaintiff
will recover more via the settlement than at trial, and the nonsettlor is not obligated to pay
anything. In the last case, the plaintiff will have recovered the entire settlement amount in
excess of what would have been received at trial. Thus, the worst the plaintiff can do in set-
tling, under a pro tanto allocation, is to receive exactly what he would be entitled to had the
matter gone to a judgment.
139. See supra note 138.
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In the emerging federal common law, the nonsettling defendant's liability
should be reduced by the greater of either the settlement amount or the
degree of culpability of the settling defendant. To apply the proposed
standard to the example set out previously, 140 assume D1 settles for
$100,000, and then P receives a judgment for $500,000. If it is deter-
mined that D1 is forty percent culpable, D2's liability will be $300,000
($500,000 less forty percent). On the other hand, if D1 is determined to
be only five percent culpable, D2's liabilit will be $400,000 ($500,000
less $100,000, since $100,000 is greater than five percent of $500,000).
This allocation ensures that the nonsettling defendant will be liable, at
worst, for the same amount as in the absence of a settlement. At the
same time, this allocation abides by the single satisfaction rule14 1 and
provides the plaintiff receives no more than she would receive at trial. 142
Conclusion
Courts should develop federal common law to ensure that a partial
settlement made in good faith will bar contribution. Good faith should
be judicially determined, with primary emphasis on the anticipated rela-
tive culpability of the settling defendant. Determination of relative cul-
pability vis-a-vis the proposed settlement should be based on a three-part
test: (1) The likelihood plaintiff will prevail at trial, (2) the range of ex-
pected recovery, and (3) the point on this range where settlement by the
defendant is fair and adequate, and thus made in good faith.
The nonsettling defendant's liability should be reduced by the
greater of (1) the actual settlement amount, or (2) the degree of culpabil-
ity of the settling defendant. This allocation will ensure that the nonset-
tling defendant will, at worst, be liable for the amount she would have
incurred had there been no settlement. Although this method will shift
to the plaintiff the risk of incorrectly estimating the value of a settlement,
the plaintiff's knowledge of the risk will encourage a carefully negotiated
settlement. This careful analysis by the plaintiff will further encourage a,
140. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 135.
142. Of course, the settling defendant may still settle for more than the amount of the
judgment. In this event, the plaintiff of course receives more than the judgment amount. This
situation is not as offensive as it might appear at first glance, however. First, the plaintiff and
settling defendant have voluntarily entered into the agreement. Second, the settling defendant
has "bought his peace" through settlement, and has gambled that the amount he would be
liable for in judgment would be more. The settling defendant's error in settlement should not
affect the rights that the plaintiff has bargained for. For example, the plaintiff may, after set-
tling with the defendant, drop the suit against the remaining nonsettling defendants. In such a
situation, the plaintiff's settlement amount is all the plaintiff will obtain, precisely the same
amount had there been a judgment following a partial settlement. See also Adamski, supra
note 8, at 564-65 n. 194 (discussing reverse contribution from settling to nonsettling defendants
in the event of overpayment in settlement).
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good faith settlement because she will bear the risk that the settlement
amount is too small. Furthermore, the court must actively review the
proposed settlement to ensure that it is adequate, in good faith, and not
the result of undue influence or overreaching.
This proposal is consistent with the goals of the federal securities
laws: compensation of defrauded persons and the deterrence of securities
law violations. 143 Such a proposal adequately compensates the plaintiff,
subject only to the risk that the determination of settlement value by
both the plaintiff and the court was incorrect. Furthermore, this propo-
sal promotes deterrence by assuring, through the tools of contribution
and the allocation of settlement amounts, that a person contemplating a
violation of Rule 1Ob-5 will be reachable via contribution and therefore
ultimately liable to potential plaintiffs.
143. See supra note 10.
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